Cal Law Trends and Developments
Volume 1969 | Issue 1

Article 16

January 1969

Trusts and Estates
Joseph S. Brock

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Recommended Citation
Joseph S. Brock, Trusts and Estates, 1969 Cal Law (1969), http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/
callaw/vol1969/iss1/16
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cal Law Trends and Developments by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Brock: Trusts and Estates

Trusts and Estates
by Joseph S. Brock*
During the period covered by this review little in the way
of trends or departures differing from established positions
seems to have appeared; there is much repetition and emphasis
of "black-letter law". There are, however, in several cases
unusual factual patterns which are of interest. The results of
these cases, interesting and of course contributing to the
normal growth of case law, seem to flow naturally and quite
easily from principles long-established and accepted, not departing from what could be expected.
There were several statutory changes, prominent among
which were the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act,
effective July 1, 1968, as well as statutory provisions which
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are applicable in estates where allocation and apportionment
problems are not troublesome.

Trusts
Trusts Involving Convicts Serving Life Sentences
Hillnwn v. Stults l is a case presenting an unusual factual
pattern in that it involves a wealthy convict who created a
trust as a method of holding and conserving his large property
interests while serving a sentence in San Quentin.
Hillman owned extensive ranch holdings in San Luis Obispo
County. In January, 1955, he murdered his wife and in
April, 1955, during the murder trial, he appointed his sister
guardian of his children. She then also took possession of his
separate property. To administer the property, Hillman and
his sister later decided to set up a simple trust, and a letter
was addressed by the sister to Hillman in which she stated
that although a deed and bill of sale purported to convey
absolute ownership to her, she nevertheless held the property
in trust for him.
Hillman and his sister had disputes concerning the administration of the ranch properties and in September, 1959, he
applied to the Adult Authority for permission to petition for
the appointment of his attorneys as conservators of his property in San Luis Obispo County. This permission was granted
and in January, 1960, the San Luis Obispo Superior Court
appointed Hillman's attorneys as conservators of the property.
In May, 1960, the conservators filed an action to establish
title to the property, to declare a trust, and to compel a conveyance and accounting of the property deeded and conveyed
to the sister in June, 1955.
On February 23, 1962, Hillman was released on parole
and appeared and testified at the trial. The following June
the court made an interlocutory judgment holding that the
property was held in trust by the sister and ordered an accounting and reference. In its final judgment in May, 1965, the
1. 263 Cal. App.2d 848, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 295 (1968).
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the trust terminated and found that the defendant sister had breached her trust.
The appeal involved several arguments. Among them was
the argument that Hillman was civilly dead and lacked the
capacity to create any trust because of his conviction and
sentence to life imprisonment, and thus the orders of the
Adult Authority and the San Luis Obispo Superior Court
were void and in excess of their jurisdiction. In discussing
this problem, the appellate court cited and quoted California
Penal Code section 2601. 2 The section does, indeed, provide
that a person sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison
for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead. It adds, however,
that the Adult Authority may restore to such person during
his imprisonment such civil rights as the authority may deem
proper, and the section preserves the convict's right to inherit
real and personal property.
As to Hillman's capacity, the court held that his limited
restoration to civil rights came within the framework of the
constitutional plan permitting limited civil rights for inmates
and parolees, and that this power of the Adult Authority was
not related to the pardoning power of the governor. Furthermore, when the legislature prohibited a prisoner from becoming a trustee of a trust it did not deny him the right to become
a beneficiary.
The argument made that the State of California was a
necessary or indispensable party to the litigation was without
merit. The court then added that the trial court's grant of
authority to Hillman to file his supplementary complaint as
real party in interest in place of conservator was approved:
The Adult Authority did not exceed its jurisdiction when
it partially restored [Hillman's] civil rights: (1) To
2. Cal. Penal Code § 260 I: "A person sentenced to imprisonment in the
state prison for Iife is thereafter deemed
civilly dead. But the Adult Authority
may restore to such person during his
imprisonment such civil rights as the
authority may deem proper, except the
right to act as a trustee, or hold public

office, or exercise the privilege of an
elector, or give a general power of
attorney. This section shall not be
construed so as to deprive such person
of his right to inherit real and personal
property in accordance with the laws
of this State.
CAL LAW 1969
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execute the deed and bill of sale to implement the trust
(June 14,1955); (2) To sign a petition for conservatorship (September 24, 1959); (3) Gave permission to
plaintiff to substitute as party plaintiff (September 13,
1963).3

As to whether any trust was created during the early days
of Hillman's imprisonment, the trial court found that the
trust was founded on an express agreement; i.e., the letter
addressed to Hillman by his sister. If, however, for any reason the trust could not have been recognized as an express
trust, it could have been considered a resulting trust for equitable reasons. The appellate court pointed out that the real
issue before the trial court was simply whether a trust was
created, not whether it was an express, resulting or constructive trust. The pretrial order permitted the court to find
anyone of the three types of trust and provided that "This
suit is one to . . . (b) Impress a trust on said property,
( d) Compel a conveyance and transfer of said real
and personal property respectively from Defendants, Stults,
to Plaintiff, Hillman.,,4 The court observed that a resulting
trust would avoid the effects of any possible innocent illegal
transactions and would effectuate the original intentions of
the parties. It further observed that a trust was consonant
with the original intentions of the parties. Aside from the
express written evidence, however, the intent of the brother
and sister could be inferred from the circumstances of Hillman's predicament. This was a classic simple trust expressed
in a letter specifying that the property was vested in the
sister for the benefit of the brother while he was in prison.
The appellants attacked the conservatorship granted by
the San Luis Obispo Superior Court on the basis that the
court had no jurisdiction, since Hillman was a prison inmate
and was not a resident of San Luis Obispo County. The
appellate court remarked that it was aware of no cases which
interpreted conservatorship provisions for prisoners or parolees. Section 2051 of the Probate Code provides that con3. 263 Cal. App.2d at 866, 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 305.
442
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servatorship proceedings for a California resident are to be
instituted in the superior court in the county of the residence
of the proposed conservatee. 5 In this case, Hillman was a
long-time resident of San Luis Obispo County and was involuntarily removed to various prisons outside his home county.
Prisoners do not gain or lose residence as a result of being
removed to the prison system. 6 The meaning of residence in
these sections is synonymous with domicil. 7 Furthermore,
the location of the property, the situs of the leases, and the
permanent home of Hillman in that county made it the
practical venue for the conservatorship.
The appellate court further stated that a prison inmate
or parolee is not required to abandon his property. While
the Adult Authority has control over the person of the inmate,
his outside property does not come within its administration,
nor does the Adult Authority have facilities for its supervision or control. The court commented that the appellants
were correct in saying that conservatorship was either very
rare or unknown among prison inmates. It may be, the
court added, that prisoners have not utilized conservatorships
for the reason that most felons have little or no property
and that it is very unusual for anyone with the financial
resources of Hillman to be confined in state prison. In any
5. Cal. Probate Code § 2051: "Conservatorship proceedings for a resident
of this State shaH be instituted in the
superior court in the county of the residence of the proposed conservatee . . . . "
6. Constitution of California, Art. II
§ 4:
"For the purpose of voting, no
person shall be deemed to have gained
or lost a residence by reason of his
presence or absence while employed in
the service of the United States, nor
while engaged in the navigation of the
waters of this State or of the United
States, or of the high seas; nor while
a student at any seminary of learning;
nor while kept at any almshouse or
o:her asylum, at public expense; nor
while confined in any public prison."

Cal. Elections Code § 14,283: "A
person does not gain or lose residence
solely by reason of his presence at or
absence from a place while employed in
the service of the United States or of
this State, nor while engaged in navigation, nor while a student of any institution of learning, nor while kept
in an almshouse, asylum or prison.
This section shall not be construed to
prevent a student at an institution of
learning from qualifying as an elector
in the locality where he resides while
attending that institution, when in fact
the s~udent has abandoned his former
residence."
7. Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.2d 235,
288 P.2d 497 (1955).
CAL LAW 1969

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

443

5

Trusts and Estates
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 16

event, the court held that where conservatorships are specified
in case of certain physical and mental disabilities by Probate
Code section 1751, 8 the further provisions of that section
are that conservatorships are available where for "cause [one]
is unable properly to care for his property
or who
voluntarily requests the same and to the satisfaction of the
court establishes good cause therefor." The statute protects
individuals who are handicapped by disabilities other than
mental. Here the disability was a physical restriction which
prevented Hillman from managing his property.
Charitable Trusts

Because of the well-known property involved, "The Irvine
Ranch", as well as the law in connection with the issues raised,
the case of Smith v. The James Irvine Foundation,9 is of
interest. The plaintiff in the action was an heir at law and
a beneficiary under the will of James Irvine who was her
paternal grandfather. She asked that certain shares of corporate stock of The Irvine Company standing in the name of
The James Irvine Foundation be held to be part of the
estate of the decedent, James Irvine. Since plaintiff was a
citizen of Virginia, whereas all defendants were residents
of California, the suit was brought in federal court with federal
jurisdiction based on the diversity of citizenship.
The stock involved in this litigation was the majority stock
of The Irvine Company, a corporation having large assets,
the largest being a tract of land known as The Irvine Ranch.
The ranch consisted of approximately 88,000 acres in Orange
8. Cal. Probate Code § 1751: "Upon
petition as provided in this chapter, the
superior court, if satisfied by sufficient
evidence of the need therefor, shall appoint a conservator of the person and
property or person or property of any
adult person who by reason of advanced age, illness, injury, mental weakness, intemperance, addiction to drugs
or other disability, or other cause is
unable properly to care for himself or
for his property, or who for said
444
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good cause therefor. The court, in its
discretion, may appoint one or more
conservators."
9. 277 F.Supp. 774 (D.C. [1967]).
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County and had an estimated worth of one-half billion to a
billion and one-half dollars. James Irvine succeeded to the
ownership of the ranch on the death of his father in 1886,
and in 1894 he caused The Irvine Company to be incorporated.
Its capital stock consisted of 1,000 shares of common stock, all
of which, except the qualifying shares, were issued to him, and
these he owned by endorsement. James Irvine transferred
the ownership of the ranch to the corporation although he
remained president of the corporation until his death in
August, 1947.
In 1936 J ames Irvine caused The J ames Irvine Foundation
to be incorporated under the laws of California. He was
never an officer or director of the foundation. On February
24, 1937 , James Irvine executed an indenture of trust in
which the foundation was designated as trustee. The indenture stated that he transferred, assigned and set over to
the trustee certain shares of stock of The Irvine Company;
he later added five more shares. The company later redeemed
some of its shares and at the present time there are 855 shares
of its stock outstanding of which 459 shares stand in the
name of The James Irvine Foundation. The status of these
shares was the subject of this litigation.
The will of James Irvine was admitted to probate and a
decree of final distribution was entered by the superior court
in San Francisco on December 29, 1952. The shares of stock
referred to in the trust indenture were not administered in
the estate proceedings nor included in the decree of distribution, and the plaintiff claimed that this stock should have
been included in the distribution of the property of the estate
and asked that it be held to be part of the estate assets. The
defendants asked that the stock in question be held to be
the property of The James Irvine Foundation and that the
trust be held to be a valid charitable trust.
The indenture of trust between J ames Irvine and The James
Irvine Foundation provided that the trustor, James Irvine,
could revoke the trust in whole or in part and could withdraw
from the trust all or any part of the property, including the
stocks. In addition, he reserved for his lifetime all income
CAL LAW 1969
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from the trust property and the right to vote all the shares
of stock held in the trust, as well as the right to direct the
investment of any liquidating dividends and proceeds or profits
from the corpus of the trust property. The trustor bound
himself during his lifetime to pay all taxes, assessments, insurance and care-cost of the trust property. Irvine provided
that after his death the balance of income, after certain deductions, should be used for any charitable purpose in California,
as authorized in the articles of incorporation of the trustee,
but that it should not be used for charities having substantial
support through taxation.
After the death of James Irvine, the secretary of the foundation sent in the stock certificates, which had been endorsed
in blank by Irvine, for transfer to the foundation. A stock
certificate for the shares was thereupon issued to The James
Irvine Foundation.
The plaintiff contended that the indenture of trust was
void as an attempted testamentary disposition by James Irvine;
that the trust indenture contained both charitable and noncharitable provisions rendering the indenture void in its entirety; that the trust indenture was void and created no trust
because it conveyed neither legal nor equitable title to the
Irvine stock in praesenti; that there was no delivery of the
stock or the indenture by James Irvine to the foundation, as
trustee, until after his death; and that after his death the stock
descended to his heirs.
The court held that the stock had not been transferred
on the stock record book of the company and that James
Irvine was the only person entitled to vote those shares
but that he had reserved that right in the indenture and he
could not have voted them had they been transferred. But
as between James Irvine and The James Irvine Foundation
the fact that the shares had not been transferred on the stock
record book was not determinative as to their respective
interests. The court further found that the indenture of trust
was delivered to the foundation by James Irvine and that the
certificates of stock had been delivered by him to the foundation during his lifetime.
446
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The plaintiff contended that the trust indenture suspended
the power of alienation of the corpus of the trust in perpetuity
and therefore was invalid because of the rule against perpetuities. The court pointed out that the State Constitution prohibits perpetuities except for eleemosynary purposes. 10 The
rule is well-established in California that trusts for charitable
uses are eleemosynary in purpose and therefore are without
the scope of the rule against perpetuities. l l
The plaintiff further contended that the charitable and noncharitable provisions of the indenture of trust were so inseparably blended as to deny the trust the status of a charitable
trust. Under California law a trust which permits the trustee
to devote the funds to both charitable and non-charitable
purposes is in violation of the rule against perpetuities. 12 The
theory of the plaintiff was that under paragraph 2 of the
indenture/3 the board of directors of the foundation might
in their uncontrolled discretion continually invest all of the
income from the corpus and thus freeze all such income
into the corpus and thereby negate the use of income for
charitable uses. The court said that in the indenture of trust,
it was stated that the purpose of the trust was to assist
California charities. The articles of incorporation of the
foundation stated the same purpose, and the two documents
were closely related. The manifest objective of James Irvine
in incorporating the foundation and in executing the indenture
of trust was to make it possible for a substantial part of his
10. California Constitution, Article
XX § 9.
11. Smith v. The James Irvine Foundation, 277 F.Supp. 774 at 793 (1967).
12. Estate of Sutro, 155 Cal. 727,
102 P. 920 (1909); Estate of Kline, 138
Cal. App. 514, 32 P.2d 677 (1934).
13. In the paragraph preceding paragraph 2, provision is made for deductions from the income of the corpus
of the trust for administrative expenses
and to make good or replace losses
suffered in the corpus of the trust.
Paragraph 2 then provides as follows:
"2. Out of the balance of said income,

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

after the deductions hereinabove provided, the Trustee may, and in the
judgment of the Trustor should, each
year set aside such sum as the Board
of Directors of the Trustee shall in its
sound discretion deem wise and expedient for investment, and said
Trustee shall invest the same in accordance with subparagraph 3 of the
powers hereinafter enumerated, which
said investments, when made, shall become a part of the corpus or principal
of the trust property, and the income
and profits therefrom shall thereafter
be used, applied and devoted as in this
trust provided."
CAL LAW 1969
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property to be devoted to the assistance of California charities.
In addition, under California code provisions the Attorney
General is charged with supervision of charitable trustS.14
The court held that the trust was a valid one for charitable
uses under the California law exempting such trusts from
the rule against perpetuities.
The plaintiff then contended that the indenture of trust
was invalid because under the indenture The James Irvine
Foundation became the owner of the majority of the shares
of The Irvine Company and look control of that company,
including its dividend policies. Thus, the plaintiff asserted,
such control would give rise to a conflict of fiduciary duties
in the use of the income of The Irvine Company in regard
to whether the income would be allocated to private commercial use or use by the foundation for charitable purposes.
The court commented that the plaintiff's contention actually
encompassed the broad general question as to whether ownership by a charitable corporation of the majority of voting
stock in a private commercial corporation is contrary to
pubic policy. The court said that if the legislature deemed
that gifts or bequests carrying with them the control of private
commercial corporations were contrary to public policy, it
could prohibit such corporations from receiving such gifts
or bequests. The legislature, however, has not done so, and
no California cases are cited which hold that this is contrary
to public policy. Accordingly, the court held that the indenture of trust was not illegal as being contrary to public policy.
Another of plaintiff's contentions was that the indenture
did not create a trust as to the Irvine stock but merely created
an agency which was revoked by his death and also that
the trust created an attempted testamentary disposition of
the stock. The court cited and discussed a number of California cases 15 in which it pointed out the distinction between
14. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 9505 and
10207.
Uniform Supervision of Trustees for
Charitable Purposes Act, Cal. Gov.
Code §§ 12580-12595.
15. Monell v. College of Physicians
448
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Savings Assn., 353 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.
[1965]).
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and the enjoyment of the interest.
After reviewing the cases, the court held that the transfers
of stock by James Irvine were not testamentary in character
and that the foundation was not a mere agent.
The court held that it seems clear under California law
that the delivery of an endorsed certificate of stock is sufficient
to effect a valid transfer of the shares of stock represented by
the certificate. 16 The court, after reviewing all of plaintiff's
contentions, found none of them well founded and denied
her the relief sought.
Another case of interest in the area of charitable trusts
is that of Hart v. County of Los Angeles. 17 The case involved
an action for declaratory relief, forfeiture, and an accounting
arising out of the last will and testament of silent screen star
William S. Hart, Sr., who died in 1946, leaving a will designating the defendant county as the primary beneficiary under
two trusts. The plaintiff was the only son of the testator,
and he contended that the county had not performed the
conditions under the decree of distribution and had thereby
forfeited its rights under the will. The will provided that
if the county failed to meet the conditions imposed, the property should revert to the state for the same uses and purposes.
The plaintiff alleged that the state would not accept the
property or trusts and, therefore, that he was entitled to the
property as though his deceased father had died intestate.
The court pointed out that the county holds the property
as trustee of a charitable trust for the benefit of the public
in general. 1S The court will not allow such a trust to fail
because of the actions of the trustee but will appoint a successor trustee if the appointed trustee is not performing his
duties. If performance by a political entity as trustee is required by some of the trust provisions and no willing political
entity can be found, the doctrine of cy pres may be invoked
to carry out the manifest intent of the testator. In this case
16. Stone v. Greene, 181 Cal. 569,
185 P. 670 (1919); Burkett v. Doty,
176 Cal. 89, 167 P. 518 (1916); and
Driscoll v. Driscoll, 143 Cal. 528, 77
P. 471 (1904).
29
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Rptr. 242 (1968).
18. Estate of Hart, 151 Cal. App.2d
271, 311 P.2d 605 (1957).
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the will had indicated that the testator's intent was that the
property was to continue in trust for the benefit of the public
and that it was not to return to the son since he had been
provided for during the testator's life.
The Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Ace 9 requires that the Attorney General supervise the
activities of trustees administering trusts of a charitable nature.
The plaintiff cited Government Code, section 12583 20 for the
proposition that the Attorney General had no power to bring
a suit against the county to compel compliance with the
terms of a trust but, representing the cestui qui, the Attorney
General must have standing as a member of the public at
large to bring the suit. But the court noted that Government
Code, section 12591, reads in part ". . . The powers and
duties of the Attorney General provided in this article are
in addition to his existing powers and duties. . . ." The
court added that even though the county itself is exempt
from the reporting duties under the act, it is not any more
immune from suit by the Attorney General than it would have
been under common law before the uniform act. 1
Constructive Trusts

There were a few cases of interest in the area of constructive trusts In Cramer v. Biddison,2 the court was involved
with a judgment of divorce which incorporated a stipulation
of the parties to the effect that:
Defendant shall maintain insurance on his own life
with death benefits of not less than $15,000.00 for each
of the minor children, or a total of $45,000.00. Said
insurance shall be maintained until the child in question
reaches the age of majority or completes his or her
college education, whichever first occurs. For the pur19. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12580-12596.
20. Cal. Gov. Code § 12583: "This
article does not apply to . . . any
state, . . . or to any of their
agencies or governmental subdivisions.
"
450
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pose of convenience, plaintiff shall remain the primary
beneficiary under said policy or policies, and the respective child shall become the secondary beneficiary.3
After the divorce, Hummer, who was the defendant in the
case, made his estate the beneficiary of all his life insurance
policies except of one $12,000 policy of which his former
wife was beneficiary. At the time of his death his three children were still minors, and none of them had graduated
from col1ege. This was an action to establish a constructive
trust to enforce the insurance provision of the divorce judgment. The appellant prayed that respondent executors of
Hummer's estate be declared constructive trustees of $33,000,
that she be allowed to trace the funds into the estate, and that
she be given a deficiency judgment for sums not capable of
being traced.
The court held that imposition of a constructive trust is
authorized by section 2224 of the Civil Code. 4 The court
said that the elements of a cause of action under this section
are three; the existence of a thing, plaintiff's right to the
thing, and defendant's gain of that thing by fraud. The
property was sufficiently identified to be impressed with a
trust since the fruits of the policies, rather than the policies
themselves are what are sought, and the proof of the "existence
of the tree on which they grew seems to us to be a matter
for trial.,,6
The complaint alleged a wrongful act since it alleged that
Hummer changed beneficiaries on all his policies and therefore that he changed it on those on which the divorce judgment required plaintiff to be carried as beneficiary. Respondents charged that the first cause of action was ambiguous
and uncertain in averring both that the proceeds were payable
to Hummer's estate and that the executors were constructive
3. 257 Cal. App.2d at 723, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 625.
4. Cal. Civil Code § 2224: "One who
gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of
a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless
he has some other and better right

thereto, an involuntary trustee of the
thing gained, for the benefit of the
person who would otherwise have
had it."
5. 257 Cal. App.2d at 724, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 626.
CAL LAW 1969
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trustees of the proceeds. The court pointed out that the
constructive trust is an equitable remedy and that one is not
entitled to it because one has legal title to property belonging
to another but rather because one has an equitable right to
property though legal title stands in another.
The court held that the general demurrers to the second,
third and fourth causes of action were properly sustained
and that the acts alleged by appellant to have been wrongful
acts of respondents were consistent with the performance of
their duties as Hummer's executors. By alleging that the
policies were payable to the estate, appellant alleged a fact
which, if proved, would have protected respondents from
liability to appellant in the absence of a judicial determination
that the proceeds were actually hers. When respondents performed the acts which the appellant complained of, the estate
was beneficiary. In overruling the demurrer to the first count
the court held that it was merely recognizing that the appellant had pleaded a justiciable claim to the property.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Herndon concurred with the
majority in holding that the first cause of action alleged
facts sufficient to state a cause of action. He dissented, however, from the holding that the facts in the second, third,
and fourth causes of action were not sufficient to state a cause
of action against respondents. The dissenting opinion stated
that it may be that the executors acted properly in collecting
the proceeds of all insurance policies as the majority opinion
held. But it does not follow that they were justified in paying
out the insurance proceeds adversely claimed by appellant to
discharge estate debts prior to appropriate adjudication. If
appellant's claim to the proceeds was ultimately found valid,
then the executors received and held these proceeds as the
trustees of a constructive trust. To the extent that the appellant's adverse claim was valid, she was in equity the true
beneficiary of the insurance policy as well as the beneficiary
of the resulting constructive trust.
The executors should not have disbursed the fund in question without awaiting an adjUdication of the validity of appellant's claim and would have been well advised to have filed a
petition for instructions in the probate proceedings.
452
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Judge Herndon added that in the more realistic modern
concept of probate jurisdiction, as recently enunciated in
Estate of Baglione,6 it is probable that the ownership of the
fund could have been decided in the probate proceedings.
But even if it were held that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction, it would have directed the executors to proceed in the
proper forum.
The dissenting opinion would have reversed the order of
dismissal on all counts.
Problems with Trustees

In the Estate of Bullock,7 the court had occasion to rule
that the superior court, in probate, has jurisdiction to hear
and determine a petition by beneficiaries for instructions as
to whether the beneficiaries may ask for the removal of trustees
without invoking an in terrorem clause in the will which had
set up the trust under which they claim.
The will of Margaret Bullock had been admitted to probate
in 1952. It contained a no-contest clause in the usual form,
providing that if any devisee, legatee or beneficiary under the
will or anyone entitled to share in the estate through intestate
succession were to attack the will, such a contestant would
receive only one dollar. Several trusts were created and the
estate assets were distributed to the sole trustee who filed his
eleventh account current and report as to certain trusts. Due
to some irregularities, the beneficiaries believed that the trustee was not suited to be sole trustee. They petitioned the
Probate Court for instructions as to whether an action by them
for removal of the trustee pursuant to sections 2233, 2282
and 2283 of the Civil CodeS would bring into operation the
no-contest clause of the will. The beneficiaries appealed from
an order that the Probate Court had no jurisdiction in the
6. 65 Cal.2d 192, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139,
417 P.2d 683 (1966).
7. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
239 (1968).
8. Cal. Civil Code §§ 2233, 2282 and
2283 provide in effect that a trustee who

has violated or is unfit to execute the
trust, or who acquires any interest, or
becomes charged with any duty, adverse
to the interest of his beneficiary or the
subject to the trust, may be removed at
once.
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matter. Their contention was that the petition was denied
solely because of lack of jurisdiction. As there was doubt that
such an order was appealable, the beneficiaries in a separate
proceeding requested a writ of mandate to compel the Probate
Court to hear and determine the petition for instructions.
The court pointed out that section 1120 of the Probate
Code9 has been liberally interpreted by the courts. The court
stated that the beneficiaries' action to oust the trustee was
not necessarily in opposition to the will or the trust thereunder.
Frowning on any proceeding which deterred an interested
party from resorting to the Probate Court in proper cases,
the court stressed the importance of maintaining access to the
courts with the least possible obstruction. The court even
suggested a moral duty not to stand silently by and accept
what is given by the trustee knowing it to be the wrong
amount. 10
With reference to the particular application of Probate Code
section 1120, the court cited Estate of Smith ll to the effect
that the language of that section was broad enough to give
the Probate Court jurisdiction over practically all controversies arising between trustees and beneficiaries and that
the beneficiary was entitled to petition the court for instructions to the trustee. 12
The court dismissed the appeal from the order below denying jurisdiction of the Probate Court and ordered that a
peremptory writ of mandate issue to the superior court in
9. Cal. Probate Code § 1120 provides: "When a trust created by a will
continues after distribution, the superior court shall not lose jurisdiction
of the estate by final distribution, but
shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose
of determining to whom the property
shall pass and be delivered upon final
or partial termination of the trust, to
the extent that such determination is
not concluded by the decree of distribution, of settling the accounts and passing
upon the acts of the trustee, of authorizing the trustee to accept additions to
the trust from sources other than the
454
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estate of the decedent, and for the
other purposes hereinafter set forth.
. . . The trustee may also petition
such court, from time to time, for instructions as to the administration of
the trust . . .".

10. In re Cocklin's Estate, 236 Iowa
98, 17 N.W.2d 129, 157 A.L.R. 584
(1945); Estate of Seipel, 130 Cal. App.
273, 19 P.2d 808 (1933).
11. 4 Cal. App.2d 548, 41 P.2d 565
(1935).
12. 4 Cal. App.2d at 553, 41 P.2d at
568.
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probate requiring it to hear and determine the issues raised
by the beneficiaries' petition.
Wills
Holographic Wills

In Estate of Callahan,13 a holographic will was admitted to
probate, and a contest of the will was filed within six months
on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, fraud, and lack of due execution. The last ground of
contest was presented as a separate issue, the other issues
being reserved, pending its determination. The appellate
court held the will legally sufficient in its execution and form
and reversed the superior court's order revoking probate with
directions to try the other issues. 14 Upon retrial, judgment of
nonsuit was entered at the close of contestants' case, and contestants appealed.
The will consisted of three strips of paper fastened together
with transparent adhesive tape. The top portion (Sheet A)
bore the date and made specific gifts, providing for payment
of taxes from the residue. It ended with an incomplete sentence: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my property, whatsoever and wheresoever
situated,m5 and it appeared that this sheet was cut by scissors
from a larger page. Sheet Bread: "I will to Helen-Gorge
[sic]-Willbur-Maurece-the sum of 2000.00 each. I will
to Margret all my stocks and bonds to have and to hold. "16
Sheet C appoints Margaret C. Young executrix without bond
and revokes former wills. The will bore the decedent's signature at the bottom. Margaret, Helen, George and Maurice
were all children of a deceased brother of the decedent, and
all were proponents of the will.
The court stated that the law applicable to the question of
whether the proponents' motion for nonsuit was properly
13. 67 Cal.2d 609, 63 Cal. Rptr. 277,
432 P.2d 965 (1967).
14. Estate of Callahan, 237 Cal. App.
2d 818, 47 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1965).
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16. 67 Cal.2d at 612, 63 Cal. Rptr.
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granted was carefully stated by this court in Estate of Lances. 17
The court then went on to consider the evidence introduced
by contestants which, viewed in the light most favorable to
the contestants, was that Sheet B was executed within three
months before or after January, 1960, and that during that
period the decedent suffered from senile dementia to the
extent that she did not know the nature and extent of her
property, did not understand her relationship to those with
a claim upon her bounty, and would not understand the nature
of her act had she undertaken to execute a will. The proponents argued that such evidence would be insufficient to
support a jury's finding of lack of testamentary capacity and
that the nonsuit was properly granted. The supreme court
did not agree.
The court addressed itself to the issue of undue influence
and fraud for the guidance of the trial court upon retrial.
It pointed out that only the children of decedent's deceased
brother benefited by the will and that there was no provision for other deceased siblings. Furthermore, the decedent
would have been capable of physically integrating Sheet
B into the will. But the court said that while these facts
appear sufficient to establish some of the indicia of undue influence/ 8 they were not enough to establish that Margaret
Young was active in procuring execution of the will. A contestant must show that the influence was brought directly to
bear upon the testatmentary act. 19
Ademption

The question of whether a mere change in the form of
property, described as a specific bequest in a will, ipso facto
constitutes an ademption arose in the Estate of Creed. 20 Creed
owned commercially developed real property. After his wife's
death he married Pauline. His sole surviving daughter by
17. 216 Cal. 397, 14 P.2d 768 (1932).
18. Estate of Yale, 214 Cal. 115, 4
P.2d 153 (1896); Estate of Lingenfelter,
38 Cal.2d 571, 241 P.2d 990 (1952).
19. Estate of Welch, 43 Cal.2d 173,
456
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his previous marriage, Betty, married Melvin Knoll, and there
were four daughters of this marriage. By holographic will
Creed specifically devised certain real property to his daughter
in trust for his four grandchildren and provided a residual
clause in favor of his wife, Pauline.
Later, Creed's daughter and her husband became concerned with estate and inheritance taxes on the devise and
suggested that the real property be transferred to a corporation and that the corporate stock be transferred to the children
in tax-free inter-vivos gifts. Such a corporation was formed
and 465 shares of stock were issued to Creed. Eighteen
shares were transferred to each of the children, aggregating
72 shares valued at $33,000. There were 393 shares of the
corporate stock remaining in Creed's hands at the time of
his death.
The decedent's widow, Pauline, contested the right of
Creed's daughter, as a testamentary trustee, to the distribution
of the property on the principle that the devise was specific,
and that ademption had occurred by the inter vivos transfer of
the real property to the corporation. Since Pauline was the
residual legatee, she claimed that she was entitled to the 393
shares of the corporate stock in the estate. The trial court
awarded the stock to Creed's daughter in trust for the grandchildren. The decedent had dealt with the real property after
the corporation was created exactly as he had before it was
transferred to the corporation.
The court pointed out that a specific devise is not wholly
extinguished because it is changed in form.1 The general rule
emerges that a change in form will not work an ademption
unless the testator so intended. The court indicated that
while an ademption might be effected when the specific property has been sold and the proceeds cannot be traced to other
property in the estate, 2 no such result may be reached in the
absence of an intent to adeem. Thus it is the extinguishment
1. Estate of Cooper, 107 Cal. App.2d
592, 237 P.2d 699 (1951); Estate of
Helfman, 193 Cal. App.2d 652, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1961).

2. Estate of Mason, 62 Cal.2d 213,
42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005 (1965).
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of the presence of the property in the testator's estate and the
circumstances surrounding this event which occur after the
signing of the will that must be interpreted and decided upon.
For this purpose the only procedure in determining the testator's intent is to admit extrinsic evidence upon such intent.
In Terrorem Clauses

In Estate of Goyette,3 the decedent, a widower, was not
survived by parents or lineal descendants, and his nearest
surviving next of kin were two sisters and a brother. Decedent died on January 16, 1964, leaving a will which was
executed less than six months but more than 30 days prior to
his death and in which he left a substantial portion of his
property in trust to a surviving sister and a nonrelative with
a remainder over, upon the death of the survivor, to respondent charities. The appellants are the children of a
surviving sister. The residue of the estate was left to
certain relatives, including the appellants. The will did not
contain a substitutionary clause in the event the charitable
gifts should fail. The will did, however, contain an in terrorem
clause which provided in part:
Fifth:
or should any person whether a beneficiary under this Will or not mentioned herein, contest this Will or object to any of its provisions, then to
such person or persons, I hereby give and bequeath the
sum of ONE DOLLAR and no more, in lieu of the provision which I have made or which I might have made
herein for such person or persons. 4
The appellants filed an objection to the executrix's petition
for preliminary distribution, alleging that the gift to the
charities exceeded the limits prescribed by the Probate Code. 5
Respondent's answer asserted that appellants had violated
testator's in terrorem clause, and thus they could no longer
object to charitable gifts. The Probate Court agreed with the
3. 258 Cal. App.2d 768, 66 Cal. Rptr.
103 (1968).
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Rptr. at 105.
S. See Cal. Probate Code § 41.
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respondents and ruled that the appellants had forfeited their
interests in the residuary estate and could not object to the
alleged excessive gift to the charities.
In discussing in terrorem clauses, the appellate court commented that such clauses were not against public policy and
could be used to prohibit legal proceedings designed to thwart
the testator's wishes. 6 Although forfeiture clauses in wills
are to be strictly construed, the scope of such a clause depends on the language used by the testator and must be enforced according to his clearly expressed intent unless it
violates a basic statutory policy. The court agreed that the
appellants violated the in terrorem clause of the will when they
objected to the petition for preliminary distribution and
charged a violation of Probate Code section 41. In so objecting, appellants were not merely seeking a construction' of
the will, as they attempted to assert, but obviously were attempting to increase the amount of their share of the residue.
The court agreed further that appellants forfeited their rights
to challenge the gifts to charities at the same time they forfeited their residuary share and that these gifts were valid
even if they collectively exceeded one-third of decedent's
estate.
The court, in discussing Probate Code section 41, pointed
out that that section is not a mortmain statute; the gifts which
exceed its prescribed limits are not void, but merely voidable
to the extent that they are excessive,7 and only if challenged
by a very limited class. Such gifts to charity are valid in their
entirety if the will contains a substitutional clause giving the
property to a nonrelative if the gift to charity should fail. 8
6. Estate of Hite, 155 Cal. 436, 101
P. 443 (1909); Estate of Holtermann,
206 Cal. App.2d 460, 23 Cal. Rptr.
685 (1962); Estate of Howard, 68 Cal.
App.2d 9, 155 P.2d 841 (1945).
7. Estate of Hughes, 202 Cal. App.2d
12, 20 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962); Estate of
Moran, 122 Cal. App.2d 167, 264 P.2d

598 (1953); Estate of Leymel, 103 Cal.
App.2d 778, 230 P.2d 48 (1951); Estate
of Haines, 76 Cal. App.2d 673, 173 P.
2d 693 (1946).
8. Estate of Sanderson, 58 Cal.2d
522, 25 Cal. Rptr. 69, 375 P.2d 37
(1962).
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Statutory Changes
Civil Code

Income and Principal Generally. The Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act, Chapter 2.5 of the Civil Code,
sections 730 to 730.17, inclusive, was adopted by the legislature in 1967 and became operative July 1, 1968.
Section 730.02 of the Civil Code provides that a trust
is to be administered with due regard to the respective interests of income beneficiaries and remaindermen. Three
standards are set out in this connection: ( 1) it is to be administered in accordance with the terms of the trust instrument,
regardless of the provisions of this chapter; (2) in the absence
of contrary terms in the trust instrument, then it is to be administered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter;
and (3) if neither of the preceding rules is applicable, then
it is to be administered in accordance with what is reasonable
and equitable in view of the manner in which men of ordinary
prudence, discretion and judgment would act in the management of their own affairs. This section also provides that
if the trust instrument gives the trustee discretion, no inference
of imprudence or partiality arises from the fact that the trustee
makes an allocation contrary to the provisions of this chapter.
Section 730.03 sets out in some detail various types of
income and principal, and section 730.04 states that an income beneficiary is entitled to income from the date specified
in the trust instrument, or if none is specified, then from
the date an asset becomes subject to the trust; and in the
case of an asset which becomes subject to a trust by reason
of a will, from the date of decedent's death, even though an
intervening period of time is necessary for estate administration.
Treatment of Depletion of Natural Resources Under the
Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act. The problem of
depletion of natural resources is provided for in the new sections of the Civil Code numbered 730.09 to 730.11. As to
royalties which are governed by section 730.09, if they are
received as rent on a lease or extension payments on a lease,
the receipts are income; if they are received from a production
460
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receipts
are income to the extent of any factor
for interest or its equivalent provided in the governing instrument. Allocated to principal shall be the fraction of the
balance of the receipts which the unrecovered cost of production payment bears to the balance owed on the production
payment, exclusive of any factor for interest or its equivalent;
and the receipts not allocated to principal are income. If
received as a royalty or any other interest in minerals or other
natural resources, receipts not provided for in the preceding
paragraphs shall be apportioned on a yearly basis in accordance with this paragraph. The receipts shall be allocated entirely to income or apportioned between income and principal
as the trustee in his absolute discretion may determine, but in
no event can more than 27-1/2 per cent of the gross receipts
be added to principal as an allowance for depletion. By its
terms section 730.09 does not apply to timber, water, soil,
sod, dirt, turf, or mosses.
Section 730.10 applies to timber and permits the trustee
to use his discretion in allotting between principal and income
receipts from taking timber from land, provided that the
amount allocated to principal shall not exceed a reasonable
allowance for depletion.
By section 730.11, if the principal consists of property subject to depletion (other than property subject to section
730.09 or section 730.10) receipts shall be allocated entirely
to income, or apportioned between income and principal at
the trustee's absolute discretion, provided that the amount
allocated to principal shall not exceed a reasonable allowance for depletion.
Treatment of Corporate Distributions. Section 730.06
deals with corporate distributions and provides that corporate
shares of the distributing corporations, including stock splits
or stock dividends, are principal. The former statute,9 provided that distributions not of the same kind or rank as the
shares on which such dividends were paid, to the extent that
they represented a capitalization of surplus not derived from
earnings, or distributions in shares of the declaring corporation
9. Former Cal. Civ. Code § 730.07.
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of the same kind and rank as the shares on which such dividends were paid, were principal. The new statute provides
that the right to subscribe to shares or other securities issued
by the distributing corporation and the proceeds of the sale
of the right are principal.
Subsection (c) of section 730.06 deals with investment
companies distributions and provides that distributions made
from ordinary income by such companies are income, and all
other distributions made by such companies including distributions from capital gains, depreciation, or depletion, are
principal. The trustee may rely upon any statement of the
distributing corporation as to the source or character of the
distribution.
Charges Against Income and Principal. Section 730.13
sets forth charges that shall be made against income and
principal. The charges against income that shall be made
are: (1) ordinary expenses; (2) a reasonable allowance for
depreciation at the trustee's absolute discretion, except that
no allowance shall be made for real property used as a residence by a beneficiary; (3) one-half of court costs, attorney's
fees and other fees on periodic judicial accounting, unless the
court directs otherwise; (4) court costs, attorney's fees and
other fees on other accountings if the matter primarily concerns the income interest, unless the court directs otherwise;
(5) one-half the trustee's regular compensation, unless the
court directs otherwise; (6) expenses reasonably incurred
for current management; (7) any tax levied upon receipts
defined as income. If charges against income are of unusual
amount, the trustee may by means of reserves or other reasonable means charge them over a reasonable period of time.
Probate Code

A noteworthy amendment to Probate Code section 700,
relating to creditors' claims against a decedent, shortens the
time for presentation of such claims from six to four months
after the first publication of the notice to creditors by an
executor or administrator.
Probate Code section 930 was amended to provide that
462
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any disbursements are proven to have been
lost or destroyed, to be unavailable in duplicate form, to
have been paid in good faith, and to have been legal charges
against the estate, the executor or administrator shall be
allowed such items. The section has been changed by allowing
any item of expenditure not exceeding "one hundred dollars
($100)" instead of "twenty dollars ($20)", and by increasing the maximum total of such allowance to "two thousand
five hundred dollars ($2,500)" instead of "five hundred dollars
($500)".
Section 718 of the Probate Code has been amended by
adding an alternative course of action for an executor or
administrator where he doubts the correctness of a claim, or
where a claim has been wholly or partially rejected or where it
may be deemed so by the claimant. The personal representative may now, in addition to the procedure set forth in the
section prior to the current amendment, enter into an agreement in writing with the claimant to refer the matter in controversy to a commissioner or referee regularly attached to the
court or to a judge pro tempore designated in the agreement,
The agreement is then to be filed with the clerk who, with the
court's approval, is to enter an order referring the matter to the
person designated. This person, given the powers of a judge
pro tempore, is to promptly hear and determine the matter by
summary procedure without pleadings, discovery, or jury
trial. Judgment is to be entered on the decision and is to be
as valid as if it had been rendered by a judge of the court in a
suit commenced by ordinary process.
In lieu of such an agreement and reference, a judge sitting
in probate, pursuant to a written agreement of the executor
or administrator and the claimant, and with the judge's consent, may hear and determine the matter in controversy.
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